1977
For one day, in 1977, illegitimate children were a source of inspiration in the Ontario Legislature. .
Mr. Lawlor: These tracks have even changed bloody trains in the middle of the junction, the high-speed locomotive coming up behind. It's not just one bill we're discussing today. It's a plenitude. Each of them has a progeny -- all illegitimate. In every case we have three different bills.
Mr. Lawlor: I have, Mr. Speaker, some misgivings about my friend the member for York Centre's position on this. If one refuses to give a blood test it says the court may draw such inference as it thinks fit. It is going to do so anyhow. If a guy says, "No I am not prepared to give a blood test," et cetera, some judges will place greater weight upon it. Some of them will ignore it.
After all, a child has been brought into the world and there are probably some other surrounding collateral circumstances pointing towards this particular person as having been responsible, and in order to escape that area of responsibility, apart from any of the numerous other things he may seek to do, such as taking off for Alaska, he may refuse a blood test. Nobody pretends the blood test is conclusive in the legislation as such, and the whole basis of the presumptions are set upon the basis of the balance of probabilities.
By the way, I want to thank the ministry staff and the Attorney General for giving us, on several occasions within the past few days, background papers. Last Friday afternoon we received this one, called a compendium of background information relating to the Children's Law Reform Act, where it goes into a quite erudite discussion of the nature of presumption generally in the law of evidence and of the particular presumptions involved in the legitimacy of children. Of course on the basic presumption as to legitimacy, a child born in lawful wedlock is presumed; and here it weighs the various levels of the presumption as to say probability, certainty, conclusively presumed, all that sort of thing. I find it not just aesthetically delightful, from the point of view of returning to my law school days, but actually having real substantive merit in the context of this particular debate. Anyhow, we will come to it with greater penetration in committee.
I want to read into the record an historic section. When I read it I think of Thomas Hardy and Jude the Obscure, I think of half the plays of William Shakespeare, and I think of all the aeons of western history and that sometimes handsome, but usually hulky lad who is the second son, the illegitimate one, who did all the work on the farm and who got none of the bloody recognition and who is treated like some form of coolie throughout all human history.
I want to read of the historic abolition of the coolie, if I may: Section 1(4), "Any distinction at common law" -- common law is a pretty cruel business all the way through; incredible the insouciance of the English -- "between the status of children born in wedlock and born out of wedlock is abolished, and the relationship of parent and child and kindred relationships flowing therefrom shall be determined for the purposes of the common law in accordance with this section."
Bless the year, jubilee 1977, that we have finally come to that. There isn't much further substance to the legislation. As far as I am concerned that's substance enough and we may have further discussion on it.
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Mr. Lawlor: These tracks have even changed bloody trains in the middle of the junction, the high-speed locomotive coming up behind. It's not just one bill we're discussing today. It's a plenitude. Each of them has a progeny -- all illegitimate. In every case we have three different bills.
By the way, I want to thank the ministry staff and the Attorney General for giving us, on several occasions within the past few days, background papers. Last Friday afternoon we received this one, called a compendium of background information relating to the Children's Law Reform Act, where it goes into a quite erudite discussion of the nature of presumption generally in the law of evidence and of the particular presumptions involved in the legitimacy of children. Of course on the basic presumption as to legitimacy, a child born in lawful wedlock is presumed; and here it weighs the various levels of the presumption as to say probability, certainty, conclusively presumed, all that sort of thing. I find it not just aesthetically delightful, from the point of view of returning to my law school days, but actually having real substantive merit in the context of this particular debate. Anyhow, we will come to it with greater penetration in committee.
I want to read into the record an historic section. When I read it I think of Thomas Hardy and Jude the Obscure, I think of half the plays of William Shakespeare, and I think of all the aeons of western history and that sometimes handsome, but usually hulky lad who is the second son, the illegitimate one, who did all the work on the farm and who got none of the bloody recognition and who is treated like some form of coolie throughout all human history.
I want to read of the historic abolition of the coolie, if I may: Section 1(4), "Any distinction at common law" -- common law is a pretty cruel business all the way through; incredible the insouciance of the English -- "between the status of children born in wedlock and born out of wedlock is abolished, and the relationship of parent and child and kindred relationships flowing therefrom shall be determined for the purposes of the common law in accordance with this section."
Bless the year, jubilee 1977, that we have finally come to that. There isn't much further substance to the legislation. As far as I am concerned that's substance enough and we may have further discussion on it.
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