Brewers Retail Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 12 R 24, 2005 CanLII 56334 (ON LA)
A child on public assistance is "a public charge". What about the children of Unionized workers? Surely those kids enjoy the benefit of collective bargaining with the government? Is the government more lenient on "a union charge" insofar as child benefits are concerned?
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onla/doc/2005/2005canlii56334/2005canlii56334.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAOY2xhd2JhY2sgY2hpbGQAAAAAAQ&resultIndex=1
A list of Union Arbitrators is a lot like a list of Tribunal Members. Maybe I don't need a lawyer after all...
1. The Union grieves that the grievor has been denied benefits under the collective agreement between the parties by reason of an improper “clawback” and discrimination contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code. The remedy sought is “full redress including damages and any and all lost monies.”
25. Arbitrator Davie then set out sections 44(1)(e), 59 and 75 of the CPP Act, observed that Revenue Canada treats benefits received by a disabled contributor on behalf of his children as income to the children, and sets out the definitions of “dependent child” and “disabled contributor’s child” in Section 42(1) of the CPP Act. She then continued (at pages 48-50) as follows:
Oh look. This supports what I said here.
Counsel submits that the children’s benefits are paid to the grievor in trust for them, and points out that they are taxable in the children’s hands, not in the grievor’s. She posits that the confusion on this issue flows from the insurance industry’s reliance on the flawed logic of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Robertson v. Robertson (1974) 47 D.L.R. (3d) 159 (a family law decision). Counsel submits that that decision is not good law. In the course of her argument, counsel took me through sections 44, 74 and 75 of the Canada Pension Plan Act (the “CPP Act”), and the family law decisions in Williams v. Williams [1995] O.J. No. 4336, 18 R.F.L. (4th) 129 (O.C.J. – General Division), Huey v. Huey [1991] O.J. No. 2249 (O.C.J. – General Division), Van Harten v, Van Harten [1998] O.J. No. 1299(O.C.J. – General Division), and Griffiths v. Griffiths [1999] A.J. No. 283, [1999] ABQB 193 (Alberta Queen’s Bench), and the insurance law decisions in Dubasoff v. Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada [1993] S.J. No. 686 (Sask. Queen’s Bench), appeal dismissed 1995 CanLII 3933 (SK CA), [1995] S.J. No. 171 (Sask. C.A.), and Hennig v. Clarica Life Insurance Co. [2001] A.J. No. 1375, [2001] ABQB 893 (Alberta Queen’s Bench), appeal dismissed [2003] I.L.R. I-4180 (Alberta C.A.). Counsel submits that insurers, including Manulife Financial in this case, have continued to rely of case law that has been discredited to inappropriately “claw back” benefits to which disabled individuals, including the grievor in this case, are entitled, thereby adding to the burdens of the disabled persons.
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onla/doc/2005/2005canlii56334/2005canlii56334.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAOY2xhd2JhY2sgY2hpbGQAAAAAAQ&resultIndex=1
A list of Union Arbitrators is a lot like a list of Tribunal Members. Maybe I don't need a lawyer after all...
1. The Union grieves that the grievor has been denied benefits under the collective agreement between the parties by reason of an improper “clawback” and discrimination contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code. The remedy sought is “full redress including damages and any and all lost monies.”
25. Arbitrator Davie then set out sections 44(1)(e), 59 and 75 of the CPP Act, observed that Revenue Canada treats benefits received by a disabled contributor on behalf of his children as income to the children, and sets out the definitions of “dependent child” and “disabled contributor’s child” in Section 42(1) of the CPP Act. She then continued (at pages 48-50) as follows:
Oh look. This supports what I said here.
Counsel submits that the children’s benefits are paid to the grievor in trust for them, and points out that they are taxable in the children’s hands, not in the grievor’s. She posits that the confusion on this issue flows from the insurance industry’s reliance on the flawed logic of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Robertson v. Robertson (1974) 47 D.L.R. (3d) 159 (a family law decision). Counsel submits that that decision is not good law. In the course of her argument, counsel took me through sections 44, 74 and 75 of the Canada Pension Plan Act (the “CPP Act”), and the family law decisions in Williams v. Williams [1995] O.J. No. 4336, 18 R.F.L. (4th) 129 (O.C.J. – General Division), Huey v. Huey [1991] O.J. No. 2249 (O.C.J. – General Division), Van Harten v, Van Harten [1998] O.J. No. 1299(O.C.J. – General Division), and Griffiths v. Griffiths [1999] A.J. No. 283, [1999] ABQB 193 (Alberta Queen’s Bench), and the insurance law decisions in Dubasoff v. Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada [1993] S.J. No. 686 (Sask. Queen’s Bench), appeal dismissed 1995 CanLII 3933 (SK CA), [1995] S.J. No. 171 (Sask. C.A.), and Hennig v. Clarica Life Insurance Co. [2001] A.J. No. 1375, [2001] ABQB 893 (Alberta Queen’s Bench), appeal dismissed [2003] I.L.R. I-4180 (Alberta C.A.). Counsel submits that insurers, including Manulife Financial in this case, have continued to rely of case law that has been discredited to inappropriately “claw back” benefits to which disabled individuals, including the grievor in this case, are entitled, thereby adding to the burdens of the disabled persons.
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